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Infrastructuring Aid: Materializing 
Social Protection in Northern Kenya  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In numerous African countries, humanitarian and development organizations—
as well as governments—are expanding expenditures on social protection 
schemes as a means of poverty alleviation. These initiatives, which typically 
provide small cash grants to poor households, are often considered particularly 
agreeable for the simplicity of their administration and the feasibility of their 
implementation. This paper examines the background work required to deploy 
social protection in one especially remote area: the margins of postcolonial 
Kenya. Specifically, it documents the often-overlooked social and technical 
construction of the infrastructure necessary so that cash transfers may function 
with the ease and simplicity for which they are commended. Attention to the 
practice of ‘infrastructuring’ offers insights into the tensions and politics of 
what is rapidly becoming a key form of transnational governance in the global 
south, especially the way in which market-based means and humanitarian ethics 
overlap. 
 
 
1. Introduction: Infrastructures & 
Infrastructuring  
 
Every two months, many thousands of poor Kenyans living in drought-prone 
areas receive around US $50 from British taxpayers. How this money reaches 
the remote margins of Kenya involves bureaucratic negotiations, political 
commitment, and ethical ideals. But it also involves rugged trucks, Post-It notes, 
and carefully washed fingerprints. As these so-called ‘cash transfers’ become a 
key form of poverty alleviation in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, this paper 
turns away from the high-profile battles over the politics and future of aid and 
humanitarianism to examine the humdrum and obscure practices that enable 
actually-existing poverty alleviation. In doing so, I follow Maurer (2012b) to 
focus on payments infrastructures—“the portals, rails and plumbing”—that 
move monetary value, in this case transferring it from Her Majesty’s Treasury to 
northern Kenya (see also Elyachar, 2010).  
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A growing body of interdisciplinary literature has turned to large technical 
systems as both objects of inquiry and objects with which it is good to think. 
Water supplies (Anand, 2011; von Schnitzler, 2008), oil pipelines (Mitchell, 
2011), medical logistics (Redfield, 2013), and more are now firmly of interest to 
anthropologists and historians operating in the loose field of ‘infrastructure 
studies.’ Infrastructure is a multifaceted concept, usually defined as the 
sociotechnical means through which goods, people, and information circulate; 
infrastructures incorporate rationalities, techniques, and material objects, not to 
mention the labor and relations that enable those. In Edwards (2003: 185) words, 
“they are the connective tissue and the circulatory systems of modernity.” Their 
absence or breakdown is thus of fundamental importance to the structure of 
everyday life.  
 
In Larkin’s (2013) recent characterization, the anthropology of infrastructure 
approaches both the “politics and poetics of infrastructure.” As means of 
distribution and “networks of power” (Hughes, 1993), infrastructures are 
“constantly ranking, connecting, and segmenting spaces and people” (Larkin, 
2004: 292; see also Graham and Marvin, 1996; 2001). They embody 
rationalities and politics (Collier, 2011)—even if the ability of any one entity to 
dictate their design is severely limited (Edwards et al., 2007). But as cultural 
anthropologists have emphasized, they also operate symbolically and 
aesthetically, stirring the imagination and entwining with ideology (e.g. Larkin, 
2008; Barker, 2005; Humphrey, 2005; Sneath et al., 2009).  
 
The ethnographic study of large, distributed technical systems has offered key 
insights into their natures and significance (Star, 1999), but also requires certain 
methodological sensitivities (Edwards, 2003; Ribes and Baker, 2006). For 
example, because infrastructure often resides in the invisible background, 
Bowker (1994) recommends ‘infrastructural inversion,’ the act of foregrounding 
it to investigate it more clearly. But what about regions where infrastructures do 
not exist as background enablers? 
 
This paper draws on Pipek and Wulf’s (2009) concept of ‘infrastructuring,’ by 
approaching ethnographically the human and material components of 
infrastructure ‘in the making.’ I draw on fieldwork in Nairobi and the north of 
Kenya to explicate the types of labor, negotiation, and struggle that enable 
functional circulatory systems in a region without infrastructural density. In 
particular, I emphasize the earnest desire of the humanitarian aid workers to 
create functional technologies, embedding them in a novel context, and having 
them fade into the background; for those infrastructuring, the technology was 
never the goal—cash assistance was—but enabling the circulation of monetary 
value required considerable attention to infrastructure. This effort involved 
negotiating breakdown through ongoing repair and maintenance (see Jackson, 
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2014). In the final section of this paper, I build on von Schnitzler (2013) and 
Elyachar (2012b) to reflect on the political values disclosed and embodied in 
this type of infrastructure, suggesting it exists within two realms: the means of 
the market and the ethos of humanitarianism.  
 
Developing and maintaining infrastructure is of particular consequence in sub-
Saharan Africa. As Edwards (2003: 188) writes, the “notion of infrastructure as 
an invisible, smooth-functioning background “works” only in the developed 
world” (in addition, see Larkin, 2008). In comparison to other regions, sub-
Saharan Africa has relatively low population densities and urbanization, as well 
as a large number of landlocked and poor countries. In addition to a history of 
colonialism, these characteristics help to account for the fact that “African 
countries lag behind their peers in other parts of the developing world” (Foster 
and Brice o-Garmendia, 2010: 1). Within the region, though, there are 
significant differences; while some sectors (such as ICT) have grown 
significantly, others (such as electricity and rural transportation) remain spartan. 
As the same assessment notes, “access of rural populations to infrastructure is 
extremely low” (22).  
 
Table 1. Infrastructural Deficit (normalized units) 
 
 Sub-Saharan low-
income countries 
Other low-income 
countries 
Paved-road density 31 134 
Total road density 137 211 
Mobile phone density 55 76 
Generation capacity 37 326 
Electricity coverage 16 41 
 
Source: adapted from Foster & Brice o-Garmendia 2010: 3. 
 
Note: Road density is measured in kilometers per 100 square kilometers of arable land; 
mobile density is lines per thousand; generation capacity is megawatts per million 
population; electricity coverage is percentage of population. 
 
Kenya, too, has seen considerable growth in telephony, with 90 percent of the 
population receiving mobile coverage. However, power remains limited and the 
transportation infrastructure is “heavily concentrated in the southern half of the 
country, along the corridor linking Mombasa to Nairobi and then on to Kisumu 
and into Uganda” (AICD 4). The northern portion of the country—where I 
conducted my fieldwork—is “sparsely populated and characterized by 
fragmentary infrastructure coverage” (AICD 4).  
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2. Cash Transfers: Kenya and Beyond 
 
The history of humanitarian and development interventions in Kenya is, of 
course, mottled, driven by a volatile mix of donors, politicians, bureaucrats, and 
recipients. In recent years, the government and major donors such as the World 
Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) have 
begun to invest in “social protection” schemes known as cash transfers. This 
method of aid has grown dramatically: a survey conducted in 2009 found 123 
cash transfer programs in sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia and Moore, 2012). These 
initiatives provide small to medium cash grants to poor and vulnerable 
populations, with some requiring that specific conditions are met (such as school 
enrolment or vaccination for children), while others are unconditional. As 
leading proponents enthusiastically sum up, the mantra is “just give money to 
the poor” (Hanlon et al., 2010).  
 
The genealogy of these forms of aid is mixed. In some cases—such as South 
Africa (and some surrounding countries)—they “reflect… a classic ‘northern’ 
conception of desert” (Seekings, 2008: 33) which provide socialized assistance 
to those populations unable to meet their own needs (e.g. the elderly, the infirm, 
and children). As Ferguson (2010) points out, in places like Kenya the precursor 
is more humanitarian than welfarist. In many cases, cash transfers are replacing 
older forms of food aid, with even the World Food Program in Kenya 
experimenting with cash instead of calories. But as I discuss below, while 
humanitarian in origin, program officials have aspirations for institutionalizing 
cash transfers as rights-based social welfare, and these aspirations are directly 
influencing their infrastructural design in the present. 
 
In Kenya, there are two large-scale and three smaller cash transfer programs, 
each operated and funded by a mix of government, donors, NGOs, and even 
private industry. From 2005 to 2010, spending on social protection grew from 
KSh 33.4 billion to 57.1 billion (from about US $367 million to $628 million), 
equivalent to 2.28 percent of GDP (GoK 2012).
1
 The two major programs are 
the Orphan and Vulnerable Children (OVC) program and the Hunger Safety Net 
Program (HSNP). The OVC program provides KSh 2,000 (US $22) to 412,470 
beneficiaries every two months. The HSNP – discussed in this paper – is 
targeted at “chronically food-insecure, extremely poor, and vulnerable people” 
in the arid and semi-arid lands, largely in the north of Kenya. Three other 
programs are much smaller in scale. The Older Persons Cash Transfer had 
                                           
1
 At the time of my fieldwork, the Kenyan Shilling was worth about .011 US Dollars. I 
provide approximate conversions where applicable. 
 
5 
 
33,000 beneficiaries by 2010, and a Disability Grants program and Urban Food 
Subsidy reached 2,100 and 5,150 beneficiaries, respectively.  
 
The appeals of cash transfers are multiple. A decades-old critique of food aid, 
most prominently espoused by Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, has recently 
become more broadly acknowledged. As Dreze and Sen (1991) demonstrate, 
importing foodstuffs tends to undermine local farmers, leading to long-term 
decay in productive capacity. Furthermore, advocates of cash transfers argue 
that aid beneficiaries often need assets beyond food. Cash, as a fungible medium 
of exchange and durable store of value, offers a more permissive type of aid, not 
likely to spoil like food. In the case of the HSNP, the shift to cash occurred after 
a realization that 60 percent of the population had relied on ‘emergency’ food 
aid for more than 10 years. “Although aid was emergency based, the hunger was 
predictable, and many believed that it could be addressed using regular” cash 
transfers (Garcia and Moore, 2012). 
 
Finally, proponents of cash transfers suggest that they are a more feasible form 
of aid, less likely to result in failure. For example, Samson et al. (2011) write 
that “In many ways, cash transfers require less government bureaucracy and 
administrative resources than other mechanisms for social delivery. The option 
of administratively feasible and affordable social transfers makes it easier for 
governments to consider implementing direct income support for the poorest.” 
Importantly, technology is key to this vision. Hanlon et al. (2010: 145) say 
“[n]ew technology is transforming the administration of cash transfers, making 
it practical in even the poorest countries” and the World Bank reports that early 
signs suggest “new leapfrog technologies” including biometric identification can 
“overcome challenges that are relatively unique” to sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia 
and Moore, 2012: 7).  
 
Similar arguments appeared throughout my fieldwork, such as the recognition 
that cash was more feasible and affordable than food: “A bag of 90kg maize 
would cost, like, over KSh 10,000 [$110] for it to be transported from Mombasa 
to [Turkana in the north]. Then, if perhaps [a beneficiary] is supposed to get a 2 
kilogram container of maize, he may end up getting 500 grams because the rest 
has [disappeared].”2 Others told me that “technology has been a great enabler to 
create an efficient institution” capable of delivering grants in rural areas.3  
 
Despite this general consensus, the ability to deliver cash to the vulnerable and 
poor populations in Kenya still requires a considerable investment in 
institutional and infrastructural innovation. Perhaps no one recognizes this as 
                                           
2
 Informant #12. 
3
 Informant #2. 
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much as those members of government, industry, and civil society that manage 
the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP). Since 2008, HSNP has provided cash 
transfers in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya. According to some estimates, 
by 2012, the program reached nearly 400,000 beneficiaries in the historically 
drought-prone and impoverished counties of Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, and 
Turkana. Turkana, where I conducted fieldwork in and around the capital of 
Lodwar in 2013, is indicative of the region, with more than 90 percent of the 
population below the poverty line, many of who are engaged in pastoral 
livelihoods dependent upon weather (GoK, 2012). 
 
 
 
Source: Wikipedia 
 
Figure 1. Map of Kenya  
 
HSNP is a partnership with the government of Kenya, funded largely by the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DfID), and with various non-
profit humanitarian organizations such as Oxfam, World Vision, Save the 
Children, and HelpAge International managing various components. 
Importantly, payments are managed by one of Kenya’s largest private financial 
service providers, Equity Bank, selected for its ability to manage such a volume 
of cash dispersals and having existing access to payments technology. At the 
start of the HSNP, qualifying households received KSh 2,150 every two months 
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($24), but due to inflation and drought, it has incrementally been raised to KSh 
4,600.
4
 Due to positive assessments, the governments and donors have agreed to 
continue and expand the program, a process I witnessed during fieldwork.  
 
With their focus on building the means of transfering cash, the HSNP team bears 
similarities to other social protection programs. In Africa and elsewhere, a 
variety of methods have been used to deliver cash grants, including fixed 
paypoints, truck-mounted ATMs, and mobile phones. Institutionally, most 
efforts have been run through state-owned banks or post offices, private 
financial institutions and payment companies, or third-party agents (such as in 
the case of HSNP).  
 
Table 2. Cash distribution systems in sub-Saharan African cash transfers  
 
Cash Distribution Method Percent 
Local office or bank 63 
Paypoint 35 
Mobile ATM 14 
Direct deposit 12 
Community committees 9 
Mobile phones 7 
Other 5 
 
Source: Garcia and Moore, 2012: 107. 
 
Note: Sample of 57 programs whose distribution mechanism could  
be determined. Some used more than one method.  
 
Proponents and designers of cash transfer programs emphasize that the choice of 
payment mechanism must reflect the capacities and constraints of the program, 
such as population density, electric and mobile coverage, and security conditions 
(see Samson et al., 2011: 189-222; Porteous, 2009). For example, in South 
Africa and Namibia, mobile ATMs are used to reach rural communities, but 
administrative offices may remain distant, necessitating lengthy and expensive 
trips. In Lesotho “a collaborative arrangement among the post office, the 
Lesotho Defence Force and the Lesotho Mountain Police [uses] military 
helicopters to access remote areas” (Samson et al., 2011: 203). In Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Project, 1.2 million beneficiaries are paid predominantly 
at government municipal offices. Earlier efforts to use vouchers and coupons 
(instead of cash) were found to be limiting because not enough traders accepted 
them; in some cases recipients needed to sell the vouchers at a discount in order 
                                           
4
 Further information is available on their website, http://www.hsnp.or.ke/ 
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to obtain cash (Hanlon et al., 2010: 149). Another assessment found that one in 
three beneficiary households needed to sleep away from home due to the 
distance to the paypoints (Gilligan et al., 2009).   
 
In an effort to extend access and ensure accountability, an increasing number of 
programs are shifting to smartcards, most visibly India through its Aadhaar 
program which aims to provide a universal biometric ID to be used in welfare 
programs. This follows an earlier initiative by the Andhra Pradesh government 
to similarly make payments under the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Program (Johnson, 2008). Elsewhere, initiatives have partnered with existing 
businesses to improve accessibility: in Brazil, two-thirds of cash payments in the 
Bolsa Familia program are made at lottery shops (Hanlon et al., 2010: 148).  
 
According to the World Bank, middle-income countries tend to have more 
“established programs expected to continue indefinitely” whereas low-income 
and fragile countries more frequently have short-term, emergency cash transfers, 
often operated by donors (Garcia and Moore, 2012: 4). Their infrastructure 
reflects such differences, with wealthier countries operating cash transfer 
programs that “typically cover a wide range of vulnerable groups and a 
significant portion of the population” relative to the others. In this regard, 
Kenya’s HSNP and OVC projects are unusually ambitious for a low-income 
country. Their respective goals of reaching 40 percent of the poorest households 
in targeted districts and 50 percent of extremely poor orphans and vulnerable 
children make the infrastructural efforts even more interesting.  
 
 
3. Of Banks, Biometrics & Barazas: 
Establishing Payments Infrastructure in 
Northern Kenya 
 
“We have issues, much issues. From training to hardware.” – Informant #10 
 
A primary purpose of infrastructure is to enable circulation; where infrastructure 
is sparse or faulty, even the simple act of dispensing cash is infeasible. At the 
broadest level, HSNP needs to move monetary value from the British treasury to 
the pockets of thousands of poor Kenyans, but the real difficulty occurs within 
Kenya, in the effort to directly reach beneficiaries. To ‘just give money to the 
poor’ actually requires multiple infrastructures, including those to move aid 
workers, money, and the identities of recipients.  
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Doing so is not straightforward, and even within Kenya’s social protection 
sector there are a variety of means of payment. Consider the Orphan and 
Vulnerable Children (OVC) program that reaches more than 400,000 
beneficiaries as of 2010. The OVC has traditionally relied on the parastatal 
Postal Corporation of Kenya (PCK) to dispense physical cash at its network of 
471 branches. To identify recipients, the staff in Nairobi prints in triplicate the 
names of beneficiaries.
5
 A copy is transported by vehicle to each PCK branch 
where recipients queue on appointed days, present their identity card, and either 
sign or provide an ink fingerprint to acknowledge receipt. From the beginning to 
successfully distributing the printed payrolls can take two weeks alone. As one 
OVC official told me, gesturing to bookcases overflowing with reams of 
paperwork, “all those bureaus, it’s a lot of work… it’s hard work.” The 
unwieldy paper books are then returned and stored at the OVC headquarters. 
There, “our finance guy,” as he was known, “has to look through all those 
papers to reconcile.”6 This tedious process of data entry eventually results in a 
digital record of who has (supposedly) been paid and who has not.  
 
Numerous social protection professionals described the system as archaic and 
uncertain. The PCK lacks up-to-date technology such as access to the national 
payment system or digital cash registers. Because financial reconciliation occurs 
                                           
5
 On paperwork, materiality, and bureaucracy, see Hull (2012). 
6
 Informant #10. 
Figure 2. Paperwork to manage the OVC. 
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manually, I heard frequent worries about the potential for fraud and leakage: 
“You see, with the manual payroll, somebody can take your ID, present himself 
or herself with the PCK, and get the money.”7 Despite these worries, the 
partnership with the PCK was considered a marked improvement upon a 
previous iteration that relied on local chiefs in rural areas to distribute envelopes 
of cash—a practice unsurprisingly marked by bias and patronage. And although 
both the head of the OVC and a World Bank representative suggested they were 
decently assured of the current systems reliability, the potential of fraud had 
motivated a shift toward an electronic payments infrastructure that used 
biometric fingerprinting to identify recipients. “With the biometric enrolment,” I 
was told, “it’s only your fingerprints, your ‘bios’ that can access your money.”8  
 
Electronic payments that used biometric authentication are at the core of the 
Hunger Safety Net Program, as well. When HSNP was inaugurated in 2008, the 
OVC system of paperwork, identity cards, and the Postal Corporation was 
deemed infeasible. At one level, the reason is straightforward: the PCK is not 
meaningfully present in the arid and semi-arid lands. As one of the program’s 
designers frankly told me, “pastoralists don’t receive mail.”9 There were 17 PCK 
branches in the entirety of the four HSNP counties, an area of more than 
220,000 square kilometers. Of these, many were not connected to a mobile 
network and in poor physical condition. Concentrating payments in these 
locations would not only be inconvenient for recipients, it could mark the 
locations as prime targets for criminals due to the volume of cash.  
 
How to proceed without the PCK, though, was less clear, so the HSNP 
pioneered a new payments infrastructure with two key innovations: biometric 
identification and banking agents. In this system, recipients’ fingerprints are 
scanned at enrolment and then used to identify them when they travel to local 
shopkeepers who were appointed as HSNP payment agents. The next three 
sections detail the efforts to create a functional payments infrastructure through 
particular attention to identification, enrolment, and payment agents. 
 
 
4. Identification 
 
“[Beneficiaries are] illiterate and we felt that it would be difficult to obtain 
signatures or for them to remember PIN numbers etcetera.” – Informant #3. 
 
                                           
7
 Informant #10. 
8
 Informant #10. 
9
 Informant #3. 
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As scholars like Mosse (2004), Rottenburg (2009), Jensen and Wintheriek 
(2013) and others have described, the imperative to audit aid programs is 
influential, encouraging meaningful changes in everyday practice (on audit 
generally, see Power, 1997).
10
 In the case of cash transfers in Kenya, one of the 
chief means of accountability is the creation of identification regimes that seek 
to block fraud, dissimulation, and errant payments.
11
 Identification is important 
at two crucial interactions: enrolment into the HSNP when personal information 
is gathered and at payment when eligible individuals receive their grant. 
 
However, governments in both colonial and post-colonial Africa have 
historically invested little in such identification schemes (Szreter and 
Breckenridge, 2012), and in Kenya many lack reliable identification documents. 
Because births often go undocumented, the ‘documentary chain’ is never started, 
thus making it more difficult to acquire documents later (Setel et al., 2007).
12
  
 
Around 2008, when Phase I of HSNP began, reportedly 15-20 percent of adults 
in the program areas lacked national IDs. For those that did have an ID, it was 
often tattered, damaged, or out of date. Negotiating the bureaucracy to acquire 
an ID was difficult, could take up to a month or more, and would incur a KSh 
100 fee (or KSh 300 for a replacement). Women may not have IDs because their 
husbands managed bureaucratic affairs, but given the more general lack of need 
for identity cards, many Turkana simply did without. As one program office told 
me, “no one is going to stop you in the middle of the desert and ask where is 
your ID.”13 Yet, for both programmatic accountability and because of so-called 
‘know your customer’ financial regulations, identification of beneficiaries was 
crucial. 
 
HSNP reacted to the challenge of identification at enrolment and payment in two 
manners. One of the partner organizations, HelpAge International, was 
responsible for advocating locally on behalf of those without identity cards. 
Their effort was assisted in the lead-up to the national election in early 2013 
where ID cards were made free and registration was promoted through a “huge 
push” in order to boost voting.14 By 2013, the situation had thus changed, with 
                                           
10
 It is worth noting that some audit occurs locally, such as community validation of agents or 
beneficiaries stopping any robbery of the program. HSNP officials mentioned such practices 
during my fieldwork, but as this paper concerns infrastructure’s ability to increase action at a 
distance, local audit is secondary. 
11
 For a similar audit imperative and biometric response in South Africa, see Donovan (2013).  
12
 In such cases, community elders are asked to vouch for the veracity of undocumented 
individuals’ claims to Kenyan birth. 
13
 Informant #3. 
14
 Informant #2. 
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far more Turkana having the national ID that was required to enroll in HSNP.
15
 
In addition to enabling receipt of the cash transfers, some people told me that 
acquiring an ID removed local forms of dependency for those who previously 
relied on ID-wielding third parties to act on their behalf.
16
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A silhouetted photo shows that identity cards do not necessary 
imply identification. 
 
While a national ID was a key component of HSNP enrolment, payment 
required a means of authenticating identity that was considered suitably secure 
and reliable. Identity cards were not likely to last long enough, it was felt, or 
may also lead to forms of dissimulation such as using another person’s card. 
Thus, during enrolment, HSNP collected digital fingerprint scans of 
beneficiaries that were then used to verify individuals before each payment. As a 
major donor official related, “I think as institutions and as a government, there 
has to be a case for secure payments. We need to provide a reasonable level of 
assurance that the right people are being paid the right amounts, in the right 
time, in a secure fashion. And I think for us and some of our partners… the push 
has generally been for biometrics and for electronic payments because, at the 
moment, those are some of the most secure, to our minds’ knowledge, means of 
paying beneficiaries.”17  
                                           
15
 In some cases, child-headed households (who lack a member old enough to qualify for a 
national ID) needed to be accommodated in an ad hoc manner, giving literal evidence to 
Star’s (1991) discussion of infrastructural orphans.  
16
 Informant #3.  
17
 Informant #8. 
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Adopting biometric identification, however, is not without its downsides. For 
one, digital fingerprinting is a relatively untested technology, prone to failure 
(Magnet, 2011), especially in places like northern Kenya. It tends to be 
expensive: the biometric authentication device costs around KSh 50,000 ($550) 
and the cost per transfer is nearly double some alternatives. Biometric payments 
infrastructure is also proprietary, meaning it does not interoperate with normal 
ATMs, shops’ devices, and the like.  
 
Instead of biometrics, HSNP could have adopted personal identification 
numbers (PINs), just like those used in debit cards around the world. PINs are 
standard, well tested, and considerably less expensive, yet they were rejected for 
reasons that reveal much about the rationalities operating within this particular 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
There were two key attributes of biometric identification that HSNP officials 
found compelling in their quest for “a reasonable level of assurance”. First, it 
individualizes identification because of the uniqueness of each person’s 
fingerprints.
18
 Individualizing cash payments was important for HSNP officials 
who spend considerable time and effort determining who qualifies for support. 
Program administrators were concerned that sharing PINs would enable 
others—whether wayward family members or unscrupulous shopkeepers—to 
defraud beneficiaries, thus undermining the program’s goals.  
 
The second reason for rejecting PINs was considered more important. Almost 
universally, when I would ask why not use PIN authentication in the HSNP, I 
was told it was because recipients were “illiterate.” “Even writing down a PIN 
and keeping it secure, I was told, “can be a challenge for pastoralists” who lack 
“desks or drawers or anywhere where they can keep some of these 
documents.”19 Biometric identification, on the other hand, absolves the need to 
remember a PIN by affixing the means of identification to the material body 
(van der Ploeg, 2002); it was thought, then, that it would remove the need for 
elderly beneficiaries to rely on a PIN-savvy assistant. HSNP recipients cannot, 
as one person put it, “forget their thumb.”20 Thus, it was quite explicitly a 
particular understanding of the intellectual (in)capacity and material culture (or 
lack thereof) that informed the adoption of biometric identification by HSNP. 
 
                                           
18
 However, see Cole (2006) for a caution. 
19
 Informant #3. 
20
 Informant #3. 
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Figure 4. Without "desks or drawers", key documents are kept on the 
person. 
 
Neither conception is prime facie wrong—and at least some HSNP recipients 
did prefer not to have to remember a PIN; yet, the belief that illiteracy prohibits 
PIN authentication is curious. For one, remembering a four or five digit number 
would not seem to be a matter of literacy; it should not even be a matter of 
numeracy, as it does not require any math. Secondly, Kenya is now well known 
for the success of mobile money services like M-PESA, including amongst poor 
and illiterate populations (Maurer, 2012a; Donovan, 2012). More than 15 
million M-PESA users manage to use a PIN for each transaction. A more 
accurate consideration would rather note that HSNP cards are used less 
frequently than mobile money accounts, thus heightening the chance of 
forgetting a randomly assigned string of numbers. Furthermore, due to technical 
reasons set by distant financial corporations, resetting a forgotten PIN is a 
difficult and time-consuming endeavor in rural areas due to the requirement to 
re-issue a new physical card along with a new PIN. 
  
Affixing identification to the material body, however, caused complications. 
HSNP needed to allow beneficiaries to nominate a secondary recipient whose 
fingerprints would also be accepted for payment. This was because some 
beneficiaries are unable to travel to payment agents and because apparently 
around one percent of beneficiaries are consistently unable to use biometrics due 
to damage to their fingerprints (such as from age, manual labor, and smoking). 
Additionally, over time fingerprints reportedly became damaged, such as 
15 
 
through a game that the Turkana people play in the sand.
21
 Even this small 
percentage has proven “a fairly big problem” according to one donor official, 
and those in charge of handling HSNP complaints and grievances told me that 
the “majority of the complaints we receive through the grievance system is 
because people can’t access their money through the card because of the 
fingerprints.”22 To overcome this type of exclusion, HSNP permitted a 
secondary recipient to be registered, oftentimes a family member who would 
withdraw cash for the actual recipient. As I was told, “On humanitarian grounds, 
even one exclusion is too much.”23 The dual recipient structure of HSNP did 
permit some form of access to those unable to use biometrics, but it also 
introduced a form of dependency, with some reported cases of the secondary 
recipient taking advantage of their dependent.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Manual labor can make fingerprints difficult to scan. 
 
These challenges demonstrate how biometric technology “scripts” reality, a 
phrase Akrich (1992) uses to represent the manner in which technologies 
“necessarily make hypotheses about the entities that make up the world into 
which the object is to be inserted.” The standards that infrastructures embody 
allow action at a distance, but this is not always equal access, troubling the 
humanitarian ethos of “even one exclusion [being] too much.” 
 
For humanitarian organizations adopting biometric technology, there are at least 
three assumptions built into biometric technology. It assumes mobility because 
it requires the person to be present for its use (unlike a PIN which can be 
shared).
24
 It assumes corporeal stability through its failure to recognize that 
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 Informant #12. 
22
 Informant #5. 
23
 Informant #14. 
24
 On the potential desirability of this in a similar context, see Mas (2012).  
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fingers deteriorate (with age and through temporary abrasions). And it assumes 
uniformity by assuming all people are equally able to provide fingerprints even 
though a meaningful proportion is incapable of doing so.
25
 This echoes Burrell’s 
discussion in Ghana of how many information technologies now being used in 
sub-Saharan Africa are not designed for such “invisible users.” This ill-fitting 
script therefore requires the dynamic of mutual orientation that Akrich (1992) 
describes, whereby adjustments are made (or fail to be made) between the user 
and technology. 
 
Further difficulties of mutual orientation between users and infrastructure are 
illustrated by the case of enrolment in biometric identification. In addition to its 
individualizing capacity, fingerprinting has been favored because of its 
presumed universality; unlike “literacy” or the capacity to remember a PIN, 
everyone can present their finger, HSNP’s designers reasoned. Equity Bank’s 
director of technology told me that “some of the people targeted are not 
numerate or sometimes you can be illiterate. And the biometric removes that 
indignity of having someone carrying a PIN because everybody is able to be 
served… it’s all part of the dignity thing.”26 
 
But achieving universality is less straightforward than often assumed. In some 
cases, would-be beneficiaries were suspicious of biometric technology (not to 
mention the novel idea of free money). Within the ethnic Somali population in 
northeast Kenya this was prompted by worries that HSNP was “capturing these 
details to share with the Americans” or “convert them to Christians”.27 In other 
instances people worried that the information would be shared with the police 
for criminal investigations.
28
 These admittedly rare instances of hesitation were 
usually overcome through a process of “sensitization”—as the HSNP officials 
called it. Through convening barazas (Swahili for community gathering), HSNP 
representatives explained the program and the technology. Here, they 
particularly valued the support of chiefs in gaining the public’s acceptance, 
demonstrating the need for infrastructure to rely on interpersonal trust and 
authority, as well as technical efficacy.
29
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
25
 For the discriminatory aspects of other surveillance technologies, see Lyon (2003). 
26
 Informant #2. 
27
 Informant #11. 
28
 Informants #3 and 11. 
29
 As Star (1999) has emphasized, infrastructure is learned as part of a community of practice. 
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5. Enrolment 
 
This social act of building goodwill and trust was followed by enrolment, during 
which the technology proved far more intransigent than the beneficiaries. The 
international humanitarian organization Oxfam largely conducted enrolment and 
allowed me to observe their work in 2013 when they were registering 
beneficiaries for HSNP’s expanded Phase II. This was an enormous task, 
involving traveling more than 400 kilometers in some cases to register more 
than 99,000 households (or more than 600,000 individuals). Registering one 
individual could take more than 10 minutes in some cases. Because of the risk of 
future drought, HSNP hoped to register all residents to enable rapid expansion in 
the future. “The idea,” I was told, “is to have a database so that when we do 
have some element of an emergency, some sort of shock, we don’t have to start 
going in to register everybody from scratch.”30 In this way, expectations of the 
future were being embedded in the present-day act of infrastructuring.  
 
To do so, they used teams of mobile registrars composed of young Oxfam 
employees from the region. Although they did not share the dress or lifestyle of 
the largely pastoral communities they enrolled, these aid workers did know the 
local language and have a better understanding of local practices and customs. 
Given the vastness of Turkana, the shoddy transportation infrastructure, and the 
time it takes to enroll beneficiaries, it was impossible for the teams to return to 
the district capital of Lodwar each night. Instead, they operated on twenty-day 
shifts, camping near the villages they were registering. In one case I observed, 
they had set up their tents inside unused classrooms and were thankful for the 
only concrete buildings when an unseasonable rainstorm swept through.  
 
These aid workers were active infrastructurers, building the means through 
which cash could ultimately circulate. But in doing so, they relied on existing 
infrastructure like the school buildings or rugged SUVs. As with the Médecins 
sans Frontières teams that Redfield (2013) documented, Oxfam relied on Toyota 
Land Cruisers, ubiquitous within humanitarian work, to traverse extended 
distances through which there were no paved roads.
31
 These vehicles are rugged 
enough to be quasi-independent of roads and also standardized enough to be 
easy to repair. It is hard to imagine establishing a cash transfer in remote 
Turkana without them, but while SUVs permit humanitarianism where roads are 
lacking, they are also a structuring, hierarchal agent. One of the everyday 
realities of Turkana is contending with fragmented, decrepit infrastructure (cf. 
Larkin, 2008) but the functionality of the Land Cruiser allows those with access 
                                           
30
 Informant #5. 
31
 Given the incapacity to repair paved roads in Turkana, dirt paths were actually preferred to 
once-paved roads, now riddled with potholes—except when it rains. 
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to move about more fluidly. As Smirl and Lister (2010) argue, being in a car 
produces an affect of speed, placelessness, and separation. It positions the aid 
worker (or visiting ethnographer) as more secure—even more dangerous—as 
the vehicle hurdles though the bush where goats and their young herders roam. 
Infrastructured space is manageable space (Dourish and Bell, 2007), but only for 
those with access to the infrastructure.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Both NGOs and Equity Bank rely on SUVs. 
 
Because Land Cruisers are so reliable, the aid workers rarely considered them. 
More central to their concern was the information technology used to build the 
administrative and payment systems for the HSNP. While some worked 
smoothly—fading into the background as functioning infrastructure—others 
were deeply problematic. For example, from the end of 2012 to early 2013, the 
fingerprint scanners used to enroll beneficiaries repeatedly failed. For 
subsequent authentication, it is important that the initial biometric scan is of 
high quality, but the finely tuned scanners succumbed to a range of maladies. 
Dust and heat proved particularly fatal, and in January 2013 the failures had 
become so frequent and the delays so onerous that they had simply stopped 
registering fingerprints, and no one quite knew how they were going to fix the 
situation. Nor did they know what exactly caused the failures: while dust and 
heat were blamed, the complexities of the biometric devices, and the fact that 
they were bought from a foreign firm, meant no one in Nairobi—let alone 
Turkana—had the wherewithal to diagnose or solve the infrastructural 
breakdown.  
 
Similar frustrations in the process of infrastructuring cash transfers arose from 
the computer software used to collect the personal details of the HSNP 
beneficiaries. In order to accurately pay the neediest, HSNP had developed a 
model known as the ‘proxy means test’ (PMT) that determines need and desert 
through an assessment of the number of dependencies, access to resources, and 
more. As one HSNP employee told me, the PMT algorithm makes calculable 
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and commensurable “differences in socioeconomic [status]… because some 
people farm, some people fish, some people herd cattle. How do you come up 
with some sort of balance where you can say this person farms here is just as 
poor as this person who does fishing there?”32 The PMT was the means of doing 
so, but it, too, was trouble.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. HSNP enrolment in action. 
 
By April 2013, the software that managed the PMT was already on version 10.1. 
Each update represented a bug, error, or incongruence that necessitated a lengthy 
process of receiving an update from Nairobi that had to be transported the last 
distance on physical flash drives because telecommunications were too sparse.
33
 
At times, this was a significant delay: from August to December work stalled 
due to a software glitch. For example, the software’s designers had assumed 
monogamy in their survey although polygamy was not uncommon amongst the 
                                           
32
 There are other modes of targeting beneficiaries, such as community voting or simply age 
(see Samson et al. 2011 for a discussion), and future work could fruitfully turn to the social 
and political implications of these rationalities. 
33
 The situation was even worse for the Orphan and Vulnerable Children program whose 
software was (for reasons unclear) developed and managed by a team in Colombia. As I was 
told, “every time you want to modify or make an upgrade, you have to go back to the 
developers, some firm in Colombia… It’s amazing how difficult it is then just because the 
system, because you know, it affects everything. It affects payments, complaints and 
grievances; it affects everything. So the system has not been able to lodge complaints for 
instance. You know, you want to check the system to see, does it have the functionality to be 
able to do this? Well we need to go back to the developers in Colombia. Number one because 
they know their system. Even if they knew the system locally, it’s in Spanish.” 
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Turkana. Similarly, it would not permit a 65-year-old man to be listed as the 
father of a three-year-old son, though this, too, occurred.
34
  
 
The Oxfam staff struggled against these meaningful tensions, attempting 
workarounds and tweaks. As active infrastructurers, they opportunistically relied 
on existing resources where possible. Because their computers would overheat 
in the mid-day sun, they worked in a thatch hut that was previously used to 
deposit food aid but had to reposition every few hours as the sun moved, 
blinding their camera used to take ID pictures. At the same time, a small solar 
panel converted the sun into an ally that powered their computers.  
 
Throughout this, they needed to negotiate with the local populations, providing 
ad hoc solutions to their needs, such as allowing registration exceptions for 
women who needed to tend to their crops. Some beneficiaries were exasperated 
by the tedium of providing so much information. “If you’re here to help,” they 
told Oxfam, “just help.” At times, beneficiaries subverted the plans of the HSNP 
representatives, leading to a sort of quiet contest as to who would control the 
emergence of the aid infrastructure. For example, as a result of the proxy means 
test, beneficiaries were assigned to one of four income brackets (very low, low, 
middle, and high). The aid workers had previously used an informal system of 
colored stickers on ID cards, with pink corresponding to very low, yellow to 
low, and so on. Although this was never disclosed to the grant recipients, they 
evidently recognized the pattern and soon enough Oxfam noticed that cards had 
been reshuffled, in contradiction to the dictates of the proxy means test. The 
quick fix that they adopted was to discard color-coding and instead use letters, 
with ‘TCW’ indicating ‘Turkana Central Wealthy. Literacy, then, became a 
tactic in infrastructural contests. 
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Figure 8. A woman holds her "TCW" slip. 
  
 
6. Agents 
 
After biometric identification, the second crucial means of infrastructuring cash 
transfers in northern Kenya was the system of agency banking, a practice of 
appointing local shopkeepers as cash dispersal entities. In early 2013, there were 
52 Equity Bank-appointed agents in Turkana who served as the frontline of this 
humanitarian intervention. HSNP agents are small business-owners—often little 
more than a stall with some packaged food and drink—that verify beneficiaries 
by inserting their HSNP card and scanning their fingerprints on a specialized 
device. If the finger’s ridges match the image on the card, then the agent hands 
over the cash with which the beneficiary is free to do as he or she pleases. As 
with a proliferating range of “humanitarian goods” (Redfield, 2012), the use of 
agents highlights the curious mix of public, private, and civil society actors who 
now constitute humanitarianism, an enormous global enterprise that Fassin 
(2007) characterizes as “nongovernmental government.”  
 
This model of incorporating local shopkeepers was pioneered for at least three 
direct reasons. First, by delegating responsibility to already existing entities, it 
reduces the upfront cost of deploying a payments infrastructure. HSNP does not 
need to establish facilities de novo. Because formal businesses are confined to 
the few population centers in Turkana, informal shops were the only existing 
infrastructure on which to build. Even today, “In the rural, the remote location, 
there is only the Equity agent.”35 If HSNP reflects a growing form of 
                                           
35
 Informant #3. 
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transnational governance (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002), the street-level 
bureaucrats of tomorrow are likely to be private shopkeepers or NGO officials, 
not civil servants (cf. Lipsky, 1980).  
 
 
 
Figure 9. An Equity agent. 
 
Second, because agents are responsible for cash management, it limits the 
ongoing administrative burden to HSNP. On average, for every 1000-2000 
beneficiaries, 4 to 5 agents are needed, each distributing millions of Kenyan 
shillings in the course of a payment cycle. This, in turn, permits a longer 
payments window that reduces waiting time and inconvenience. Finally, the 
combination of lower costs enables a much larger network of payment points to 
be established, assisting their goal of having an agent within 7 kilometers of all 
recipients.
36
  
 
At HSNP’s inauguration, regulations from the Central Bank of Kenya did not 
allow non-banks to provide financial services. Such a rule is common in the 
prudential world of financial regulators, and required Equity Bank to acquire a 
special exemption to deputize would-be agents. Today, though, agency banking 
has grown enormously in Kenya and elsewhere through its use in mobile money, 
                                           
36
 It is perhaps worth emphasizing that despite this highly capillary form of distribution, 
HSNP beneficiaries still need to be highly mobile to reach the agents. Although some HSNP 
officials were of the opinion that 7 kilometers is normal for pastoralists, others noted that if 
something went awry at the agent (such as a biometric device failure), it was a long distance 
there and back for naught.  
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where agents are sometimes referred to as “human ATMs” (Maurer et al., 2013). 
This phrase is revealing for distilling what is the core purpose of the agents: cash 
provision. As with Latour’s (1994) discussion of ‘gunman’ it also reveals the 
interlacing of both human and machine in the provision of cash. That is, the 
union of shopkeeper and biometric device is what allows this infrastructure to 
function. 
 
For a range of reasons, a purely automated teller machine would not be feasible 
in Turkana where the necessary supporting infrastructures are absent. First, 
HSNP agents are responsible for acquiring the necessary cash to pay 
beneficiaries. Because bank branches are scant, this can involve considerable 
travel, but the shopkeepers already have the need and means to acquire cash for 
their businesses. Additionally, because serving as an agent implies a significant 
amount of new customers, the agents have a clear incentive to gather cash from 
afar. In programs that do not use agents—such as the OVC—I was told that 
centralized cash management is “a nightmare” requiring armored trucks, 
insurance, and logistics.
37
 Delegating the requirement onto properly incentivized 
entities removes this difficulty from the social protection program. Additionally, 
electricity is at best unreliable but more likely altogether absent. To surmount 
this challenge, payment devices are battery powered and recharged through solar 
panels that Equity provides on credit to the agents. HSNP’s payment devices 
also function with intermittent telecommunications infrastructure: balancing and 
reconciling the accounts can occur whenever the agent is able to travel to a 
location with network coverage. This was necessary because at the beginning 
only 40 percent of Turkana had mobile network coverage.
38
  
 
In addition to using agents to cope with infrastructural deficits, HSNP actively 
sought certain social, cultural, and interpersonal characteristics from their 
‘human ATMs’. Chief amongst these is trustworthiness: Equity does due 
diligence to ensure they are not selecting anyone nefarious, combing what 
formal records exist and querying the local community about the character of a 
would-be agent. Although the agents’ profit interest is crucial to their enrolment, 
HSNP officials expressed a desire to avoid agents who were driven only by such 
a motivation. 
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 Informant #15. 
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 Although it has improved, mobile coverage is still limited, so HSNP is moving toward 
satellite connections in order to improve the real-time connection to agents. In part, this is 
motivated by financial regulations—written without Turkana in mind—that require real-time 
reconciliation for providers of full-service finance (a goal of Equity Bank for its currently 
special-purpose agents). 
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Figure 10. An HSNP / Equity biometric scanner. 
 
They also need people with compassion and understanding of the needs of the 
recipients that a machine would be incapable of providing. As the head of 
Equity in Turkana told me, “We wanted an agent who would be a bit humane, 
treat them with dignity and be able to humble himself.”39 As such, they provide 
training to convey the humanitarian ethos of HSNP and the goals of the service. 
For example, entering the formal Equity Bank branch in Turkana can be 
intimidating: the whir of a generator, the marble facades, the glass partitions, 
and the bevy of technologies clearly set the space off from the rest of the locality 
(cf. Augé, 2009). A shopkeeper from the community is far more approachable. 
 
The method has proven largely successful, with few complaints, even though 
there is the potential for agents to take advantage of the grant recipients. Only in 
one case was impropriety found to be occurring: when the grant was valued at 
KSh 2,250, a couple of agents began dropping the last KSh 250 ($3) because of 
the difficulty providing such small denominations in such volume; instead, they 
offered free goods from their shop valued around KSh 250. When Equity 
learned of this, they disciplined or dropped the offending agents, explaining that 
“the [human] rights component is always there to check any malpractice and 
what have you.”40 In this case, it was the pragmatics of actually existing money 
(the denominations and difficulty of creating change) that shaped behavior; it 
was only the regulative ideal of rights-based humanitarianism that corrected it.
41
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 Informant #12. 
40
 Informant #12. 
41
 On the pragmatics of money, see Maurer (2011) and Guyer (2004). I thank Taylor Nelms 
for his comments on this point. 
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Figure 11. The materiality of money matters. 
 
The use of agents illustrates a particular strategy of infrastructuring: delegation, 
meaning the exchange of human for technical labor (and vice versa) (Ribes et 
al., 2012). HSNP has delegated to both technologies and individuals, both with 
varying degrees of success. Agents are particularly interesting because they 
exhibit elements of both black-boxed technology and skillful humans. On the 
one hand, HSNP desires cash distributors who are objective, delivering money 
without inappropriate behavior such as fraud or theft. As one Equity official told 
me, the ideal agent is “somebody who will practice what we say.”42 On the other 
hand, they want subjectivity, the sort of human touch that will assist with 
troubles when they arise.
43
 Of five payments I witnessed occurring, two of the 
fingerprint authentications originally failed; they succeeded only through the 
assistance of the payment agent who scrubbed the finger clean and placed it on 
the device correctly, cajoling human and machine to successfully interact (cf. 
Suchman, 2006).  
 
                                           
42
 Informant #12. 
43
 The goal is transmission, but recognizing that certain transformations will be needed in 
order to do so; in the words of actor-network theory, ‘intermediation’ requires some 
‘mediation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1999). On objectivity more generally, see Daston and 
Galison (2007).  
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Figure 12. Scanning an HSNP recipient. 
 
Agents—in addition to other arts of infrastructuring discussed here—can be 
understood as a means of ‘embedding’ foreign practices into Turkana (cf. 
Ancelovici and Jenson, 2013). Following Giddens (1991), Takhteyev (2012) has 
discussed the type of practical work, tacit knowledge, and technical 
accommodation necessary to take a practice like cash transfers from one location 
to another: 
 
“First, some elements of a practice—people, ideas, tools—must be 
dislodged from their original context, changed so as to become 
mobile. Such mobile elements then arrive in a new place, but do so as 
isolated pieces, disconnected from other elements that gave them 
power within the original system. To regain this power, they must be 
re-embedded—become a part of a local system… This usually means 
that elements brought from afar would need to be made to work with 
those of local origin, many of them repurposed or pulled out of extant 
systems. The resulting system will be an assemblage of ill-fitting parts 
“hacked together,” to borrow a programmers’ term.” 
 
Arguably this process of embedding infrastructure is made more difficult by the 
paucity of existing resources on which to build. Although the aid workers I 
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observed were opportunistic, they could hardly create what Braun (1994) calls 
“second-order” infrastructures, meaning creating new infrastructures by 
recombining existing ones. Even where there was an “installed base” (Star, 
1999) on which to build, such as shopkeepers, rules needed to be changed to 
permit their use as financial intermediaries. Far more common was the case of 
biometric identification: a technology novel in most of the world, let alone 
Turkana. The act of embedding it within the Turkana context required endless 
maneuvering, each with their own set of supporting practices. Solar panels could 
power the biometric devices at agents, but required extending credit to 
shopkeepers who could not purchase them outright. Tablet computers could 
acquire the necessary administrative data in bulk but required shade during the 
day and software updates to be carried to the field by flash drive. Identity cards 
could be acquired, but needed the cooperation of local bureaucrats as well as 
pockets in which to keep them.  
 
Pull a single strand of the cash transfer infrastructural web and who knows how 
far it will go, yet given enough infrastructuring, circulation can occur, as cash 
does with a high degree of success in the Hunger Safety Net Program. 
 
 
7. Between Consumers and Citizens: The 
Politics of Infrastructuring Aid 
 
Cash transfers have risen to prominence within the humanitarian and 
development sector as a feasible means to alleviate poverty, reduce 
vulnerability, and meet other goals such as boosting health and education. The 
logic follows a quasi-Hayekian view of the poor as rational actors and markets 
as a means to effectively meet their needs (see Ferguson, 2010). Attention to the 
methods of cash delivery serve as a reminder of the labor and investment needed 
in order to create a market (Elyachar, 2012a). As Redfield (2012) notes for a 
range of new humanitarian interventions, this work is done through a curious 
mix of public, private, and non-profit entities. 
 
As I have described, constructing a market is also a matter of everyday 
engineering. As recent social studies of finance have shown, embodiment and 
equipment matter to the types of markets that are created (MacKenzie, 2009; 
Callon, 1986). For those creating the HSNP infrastructure, manufacturing 
consumers was explicitly part of their understanding of their own work: 
“Pastoralists haven’t been members of the national economy” before HSNP, I 
was told. And the particularities of the infrastructural designs would create 
different types of markets, such as those that excluded women without identity 
cards or elderly people unable to travel. 
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In addition to creating consumers, infrastructuring here creates citizens. In this 
case, biometric technology is both a “market device” (Callon et al., 2007) but 
also what might be called a ‘citizenship device’. For many of the HSNP 
officials, cash transfers were a way of incorporating remote Kenyans into the 
nation and were deeply ingrained with a rights-based mentality. This was most 
evident in the promotion of national identity documents, but also in the 
aspirations to build a more encompassing and durable welfare initiative. 
 
As von Schnitzler (2013: 673) has recently explored in the South African case, 
infrastructures come “to mediate a diversity of competing ethical projects, 
political disagreements, and subterranean conflicts that often concern central 
political questions of civic virtue, basic needs, and the rights and obligations of 
citizenship.” For example, Guldi (2012: 23) has documented how public access 
roads “enable the participation of poor people and poorer regions” and Maurer 
(2012b) argues in favor of state-backed money as a “public infrastructure”, 
usable without “a toll on the means of value transfer.” 
 
In the case of HSNP, these infrastructural particularities became evident. Money 
affords a range of possibilities that food did not, including communal well 
digging and an increasing amount of formal savings accounts. In this way, 
HSNP created an infrastructure that “set in motion other types of flows that 
operate in the space capital provides and that travel the routes created by these 
new networks” (Larkin, 2004: 292). And the HSNP team had explicit aspirations 
to continue such second-order effects. For one, they would like to offer 
beneficiaries formal bank accounts, convinced of the developmental benefits of 
savings and other financial services.
44
 Here, basic needs were justified on 
humanitarian grounds and enacted through market devices. Throughout my 
fieldwork, although market means were pursued, they were embedded in an 
ethos and ethical regime of humanitarianism. As mentioned above, shopkeepers 
were castigated for violating “the rights component” of HSNP. Biometric 
scanners were adopted to meet beneficiary “dignity” and errors were fixed “on 
humanitarian grounds.” While not carefully theorized or explicated, these 
discourses provided an ethical repertoire that shaped and was shaped by the act 
of infrastructuring.
45
 
 
HSNP also had aspirations more recognizable as reflecting the rights of 
citizenship. One interesting plan that was taking shape in early 2013 is a plan to 
fund “one-stop human rights shops” where instead of just collecting complaints 
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 On the growth of ‘financial inclusion’ see Schwittay (2011), Roy (2010), and Manji (2010). 
45
 As with other humanitarianism, expediency was crucial, and technical solutions were often 
pursued to the detriment of other considerations, most notably the privacy implications of a 
massive state-based registration scheme (see Hosein and Nyst, 2013). However, there were 
signs this was changing and a broader view of citizenship was emerging (see CaLP, 2013).  
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and grievances about the program, HSNP infrastructure would be used to 
advocate on behalf of a broader range of rights violations in places like Turkana 
(cf. Moyn, 2012). This, of course, would be a high order (cf. Englund, 2006) but 
accorded with aspirations to leverage the seeming success of humanitarian cash 
transfers for more substantive initiatives, including ongoing plans to unify and 
institutionalize the five different cash transfers into a fledgling state-based 
welfare program (though largely donor funded) (cf. Ferguson, 2013). While the 
road to such a future would be long, the aspirations were already shaping 
infrastructural design in the present: through the aforementioned plan to enroll 
everyone in the arid and semi-arid lands, but also to combine these into a “single 
registry” with other cash transfers in Kenya, perhaps creating the administrative 
infrastructure of a welfare state.
46
 
 
Despite all this, much of the actually existing infrastructure of humanitarianism 
in northern Kenya remained special-purpose and exclusive. SUVs sped past 
pastoral communities; biometric scanners remained the property of the program 
(and would hardly be useful otherwise). The aid workers I observed were, in 
large part, interested in making the technology disappear and fade into the 
background. They did not want their infrastructure to be open to contestation, 
but rather simply to work (cf. Ferguson, 1994). A focus on solving narrowly 
defined problems (i.e. a paucity of cash) has contributed to the “minimalist 
biopolitics” that Redfield (2012) says characterize humanitarianism. Fostering 
life, yes, but in a constrained and particular manner. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The various tactics taken in establishing cash transfers in locations like Turkana 
encourage the conceptualization of “infrastructure as a transitive verb” (Edwards 
et al., 2009: 370). Thinking along the lines of ‘establishing the infrastructure’ is 
misleading, both because it is never finished and because it always remains 
tenuous: a change of donor heart in London could cripple the infrastructure.  
 
As those operating cash transfer programs are quick to acknowledge, the means 
of registering and paying beneficiaries are crucial infrastructural challenges. 
This is a particular challenge given the paucity of existing infrastructure, 
especially in the rural areas where poverty and food insecurity are often most 
challenging. As I have sought to illustrate, creating a (largely) functional cash 
transfer infrastructure requires far more than installing “leapfrog technology” 
(cf. Garcia and Moore, 2012: 7).  
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 On this relationship between registration and welfare, see Szreter and Breckenridge (2012).  
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Creating the means to circulate monetary value in areas largely disconnected 
from the global financial infrastructure requires a combination of social and 
material efforts. What results is opportunistic, delicate, and unwieldy, but also 
clever, largely functional, and novel. It is a true bricolage. Infrastructuring aid, 
as I have argued in this case requires bodies and trucks, negotiations and trust, 
telecom towers and solar rays. But we could do more to encourage a less 
minimalist approach, an imaginative shift from humanitarianism to 
infrastructure that is widely enabling.  
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